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Barnett: Why Bias Challenges

Why Bias Challenges to Administrative
Adjudication Should Succeed
Kent Barnett*

I. INTRODUCTION
How much confidence would you have in a judge whom your opponent
hired, can pay bonuses to, and can seek to discipline or remove? If your answer is not much, then you best not interact with the federal government. I
recently argued that numerous administrative adjudicators very likely suffer
from an unconstitutional appearance of partiality because the agencies that
are often parties in administrative hearings can hire, pay bonuses to, discipline, and remove these adjudicators.1
In this Article for the Missouri Law Review’s Symposium on A Future
Without the Administrative State?, I contend that challenges to adjudicators’
appearance of partiality are well positioned to be part of the new wave of
structural challenges to the administrative state. Many of these structural
challenges have arisen in the separation-of-powers context, which has experienced a renaissance since 2010. From the President’s supervisory powers2 to
appointments of federal officers,3 from Article III protections4 to judicial
review of administrative action,5 from delegation of powers to private parties6
to legislative standing,7 the Supreme Court of the United States and individu*

Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.
1. Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643,
1650–83 (2016) [hereinafter Barnett, Against Administrative Judges]. See Kent Barnett, Opinion, Due Process v. Administrative Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2015, 5:20
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/due-process-vs-administrative-law-1447626023.
2. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
478–79 (2010).
3. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014).
4. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 469 (2011).
5. See Brian Lipshutz, Note, Justice Thomas and the Originalist Turn in Administrative Law, 125 YALE L.J.F. 94 (2015) (summarizing Justice Thomas’s recent call
for reconsidering judicial deference to agency action); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212–13 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court
should stop deferring to agencies’ interpretations of their regulations under so-called
Auer deference); see also id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring) (encouraging reconsideration of Auer deference); accord id. at 2010–11 (Alito, J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts, in an earlier concurring opinion in which Justice Alito joined, stated his
willingness to reconsider Auer deference. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S.
Ct. 1326, 1338–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
6. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231 (2015).
7. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013) (relying upon the
U.S. House of Representatives’ Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group’s “sharp adversarial
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al Justices have welcomed structural challenges to the administrative state
and Article I courts.8 Although not sounding in separation of powers under
current doctrine,9 partiality under the Due Process Clause concerns prophylactic limitations that protect adjudicators’ independence and, more broadly,
cabin how administrative adjudication can occur.10
Administrative adjudication’s partiality problem is a worthy candidate
to join these claims for three reasons. First, prohibiting administrative adjudicators’ partiality, unlike some other structural areas, does not require overruling prior decisions and relies heavily on the Court’s recent precedent.
Second, partiality challenges fit comfortably within the Court’s penchant for
formalism and prophylaxes in structural constitutional matters. Indeed, formalism is much more justified for partiality challenges than certain other
structural issues and has a longer jurisprudential provenance. Finally, as
compared to other proposed challenges to the administrative state, challenges
based on administrative partiality are more likely to earn enough votes to
succeed. Because finding partiality within the administrative state would
likely have significant, widespread disruptive effects, the President, agencies,
and Congress should rethink administrative adjudication before courts make
them do so.

II. THE PARTIALITY ARGUMENT AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES
In a recent article,11 I contended that certain administrative adjudicators
have an appearance of partiality that very likely violates the Due Process
Clause. These adjudicators go by many names – such as hearing officer, Immigration Judge, Patent Appellate Judge, or hearing examiner – but are collectively referred to as “Administrative Judges” or “AJs,” titles similar to the
more well-known Administrative Law Judges or ALJs.12 The approximately
1600 ALJs and approximately 3300 AJs perform the same function.13 They
preside over trial-like administrative hearings, admit evidence, make credibility determinations, and issue initial opinions after compiling an evidentiary
record.14 In these hearings, agencies, which often appear as parties, can seek
presentation” to find Article III standing, but not deciding whether the group itself
had Article III standing).
8. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338–39.
9. But see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012) (arguing that due process was understood to concern separation of powers and limited the legislature’s ability to affect
individual rights).
10. Id. at 1773.
11. For the thorough development of this due process argument, see Barnett,
Against Administrative Judges, supra note 1. What follows is a summary of that
argument, for which I shall refer only to the most relevant authority.
12. Id. at 1659–60.
13. Id. at 1652.
14. Id.
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to enforce statutory or regulatory provisions by awarding or terminating benefits, issuing or revoking licenses, assessing penalties, or resolving disputes
between private parties.15 Despite their similar names and functions, almost
all AJs lack the statutory independence of ALJs.16
Start by contrasting AJs’ and ALJs’ appointments. All of the nearly
1600 ALJs17 are appointed under a merit-focused statutory selection process.
Although the agency for which an ALJ works directly appoints the ALJ,18 an
independent agency, the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), limits
the choice to the three highest-scoring candidates based on written examination and other scores.19 To certain agencies’ chagrin, the OPM does not consider candidates’ subject-matter expertise but instead seeks to hire generalists.20 In contrast, an agency’s ability to appoint nearly all AJs is not constrained by similar statutory procedures or an independent agency’s oversight.21 At most, agencies may be bound by general Civil Service requirements22 and use self-crafted hiring guidelines.23
After AJs and ALJs are hired, the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) protects ALJs, but not AJs, from their agencies in various ways.
ALJs must preside over “formal adjudication” – i.e., hearings that are required to be “on the record.”24 With formal adjudication, ALJs cannot perform investigative or prosecutorial functions, nor report to an agency official
who does.25 They generally cannot have ex parte communications with the
15. Id. at 1647.
16. Id.
17. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,

586 tbl.C (2010) (noting that the Office of Personnel Management informed the Court
that there were 1584 federal ALJs, 1334 of whom worked within the SSA).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
19. See VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607,
LAW
JUDGES:
AN
OVERVIEW
2–3
(2010),
ADMINISTRATIVE
http://ssaconnect.com/tfiles/ALJ-Overview.pdf.
20. See OPM, EXAMINATION ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 318, at 8 (1996).
21. See Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1347 (1992) (“The selection and appointment procedures for
administrative judges are controlled by the agencies themselves.”). A key exception
exists for certain members of the Board of Contract Appeals, who, per statute, must
have “at least 5 years of experience in public contract law” and be appointed in the
same manner as ALJs. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a)(2), (b)(2)(A), (d)(2). The appointment
process, although similar to that for ALJs, is handled by the hiring agencies, not the
OPM. See 2 PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES,
RECOMMENDATIONS
AND
REPORTS
950–51
(1992),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/19922%20ACUS%20(Green%20Book).pdf.
22. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301, 2302 (West 2016).
23. See John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal
Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 272 (1992).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
25. Id. §§ 554(d)(2), 3105.
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parties (including agency officials) concerning a fact issue.26 Agencies cannot give ALJs performance reviews27 or pay them bonuses.28 Because AJs, in
contrast, cannot preside over formal adjudication, they do not receive formal
adjudication’s protections.29 No statute prohibits them from engaging in investigative or prosecutorial functions or reporting to those who do, receiving
performance reviews or bonuses from the agencies that appear before them,
or communicating with agency officials concerning facts at issue in a pending
case.30 Indeed, based upon the most recent data, 83% of AJs are subject to
agency-led performance reviews.31
The key difference between ALJs and AJs concerns their protection (or
lack thereof) from discipline and removal. Agencies may discipline or remove ALJs only for “good cause established and determined by the Merit
Systems Protection Board [(“MSPB”)]” after a formal administrative hearing.32 The MSPB members also enjoy protection from at-will removal because the President can remove them “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office.”33 Contrary to this significant job protection for all
ALJs, nearly all AJs lack statutory protection from discipline or removal.34
AJs’ lack of statutory protections to shield them from agency oversight
likely creates an unconstitutional appearance of partiality based on three related considerations. First, due process applies to administrative adjudication
and precludes appearances of partiality, as the Supreme Court so held when
considering whether the use of insurance-carrier hearing officers to decide
Medicare claims violated due process.35
26. Id. § 554(d)(1).
27. See FED. ADMIN. JUDICIARY, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION

92–7, at 2 (1992), https://goo.gl/C4psHb [hereinafter 1992 ACUS RPT.]
28. 5 C.F.R. §§ 903.206(a)–(b), 903.210(b) (West 2016).
29. 1992 ACUS RPT., supra note 27, at 2.
30. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 1305.
31. RAYMOND LIMON, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY THEN AND NOW – A DECADE OF CHANGE 1992–2002, at 4
(2002).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
33. Id. § 1202(d). The MSPB’s protection from removal only for inefficiency,
neglect, and malfeasance appears strong because no President has ever attempted to
remove any official (whether a MSPB member or other official with similar protection) under this standard. See id. See also Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent
Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1379 (2012) [hereinafter Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon].
34. Only a small group of judges on the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals
shares ALJs’ statutory protections from removal. 41 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(3).
35. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1982) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975)
(“[Due process] applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to
courts.” (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973)). The Court in
McClure noted that the challenging party did not assert that the hearing officers at
issue were actually biased. See McClure, 456 U.S. at 195 n.8.
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Second, a litigating party’s disproportionate role in appointing a judge
before whom it is certain to appear creates an unconstitutional appearance of
partiality. This principle comes from Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., in
which the Court held that such an appearance existed when a party with a
case pending before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia provided
substantial and disproportionate contributions for the campaign of one of the
justices.36 This scenario implicated the principle that “fears of bias can arise
when – without the other parties’ consent – a man chooses the judge in his
own cause.”37 The Court did not care that the justice denied harboring any
actual bias38 or that voters directly elected the justice. With AJs, agencies do
more than indirectly appoint them through disproportionate influence; they
directly “choose[] the judge in [their] own cause” without even the oversight
of an independent agency, as with ALJ hiring.39
Third, the ability to discipline, remove, or affect the salary of an adjudicator also creates an unconstitutional appearance of partiality. The Supreme
Court emphasized in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board that at-will removal directly affects whether an official is independent: “[O]ne who holds his office only during the pleasure of another
cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the
latter’s will.”40 With AJs, agencies that often appear as parties can discipline,
remove, or award bonuses with only limitations that exist under general Civil
Service Laws.41 Together, agencies’ appointment and control over AJs likely
creates an appearance of partiality that offends due process. Partiality challenges, as I discuss in Parts III and IV, are consonant with due process precedent and structural challenges generally.

III. CONSISTENCY WITH PARTIALITY PRECEDENT
Partiality challenges concerning AJs are consistent with the Supreme
Court’s prior decisions and rely heavily on its most recent decisions. The
relevant partiality precedent mostly concerns state adjudicators, but it is consistent with finding that AJs have a due process problem. The Supreme Court
decisions that concern administrative adjudicators are either distinguishable
or seemingly limited by more recent decisions.42
The two most relevant decisions concerning state judges – Tumey v.
Ohio and Ward v. Village of Monroeville – are important because they reveal
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886–87 (2009).
Id. at 886.
See id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493
(2010) (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
41. Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 1, at 1660.
42. See generally Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
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that pecuniary incentives (whether flowing directly to the adjudicator or a
budget that the adjudicator oversees) create an unconstitutional appearance of
partiality.43 Due process takes offense when a “judge . . . has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against [a party]
in his case.”44 Such an interest existed, the Supreme Court explained in Tumey, when the township and the mayor (as a salary supplement) each received a portion of fees assessed after the mayor decided that the defendant
violated Ohio’s alcohol-prohibition statute.45 Likewise, in Ward, the Due
Process Clause required a mayor’s recusal from certain ordinance- and traffic-violation cases when the assessed fees were a significant portion of the
village’s revenue but did not augment the mayor’s income.46 For AJs, these
decisions indicate that the ability of the party-agency to review AJ performance and award AJs salary bonuses is problematic. The fear that the AJ
will rule for the agency to obtain its favor “offer[s] a possible temptation to
the average [person] as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and
true between the [agency] and the [regulated party].”47
Of the three key Supreme Court decisions concerning partiality and administrative adjudicators, the first is of limited relevance. Withrow v. Larkin
permitted members of a state agency to sequence nonadversary investigatory
hearings with later adjudicatory hearings to decide whether to revoke a medical license.48 At most, this decision suggests that AJs’ ability to adjudicate
and engage in other agency duties does not alone raise a partiality problem.
Otherwise, it tells us little about appearances of impartiality for lower-level
agency officials.
The second decision – concerning ALJs – is more germane and suggests
that AJs’ lack of statutory protections is relevant to their impartiality. In Butz
v. Economou, the Supreme Court granted ALJs absolute official immunity
when a disappointed litigant in administrative proceedings sought damages in
a collateral lawsuit.49 In so doing, the Court determined that collateral lawsuits were not necessary because procedural protections in formal agency
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Tumey, 273 U.S. at 514–15; Ward, 409 U.S. at 60.
Ward, 409 U.S. at 59–60 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (1927)).
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535.
Ward, 409 U.S. at 59–60.
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. The mere payment of fines or fees to the agency
would probably not be enough to raise the Due Process Clause’s hackles, despite the
fact that the AJ works for the agency and may indirectly benefit from the filled agency coffers. In Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928), a decision that the Ward Court
distinguished, the Court held that a mayor’s limited executive authority and lack of
fiscal responsibilities for the town rendered his connection between the fees paid to
the town and role as adjudicator “too remote” to create a due process violation.
Ward, 409 U.S. at 61. For AJs, even assuming that the fines are paid directly to the
agency instead of the government generally, AJs’ lack of responsibility for agency
fiscal matters likely precludes a due process violation.
48. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57 (1975).
49. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512–13 (1978).
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adjudication and appellate judicial proceedings permitted opposing arguments
and error correction.50 More significantly, it held that the “more important”
consideration was that “the process of agency adjudication is currently structured [under the APA’s requirements for on-the-record hearings] so as to
assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the
evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials
within the agency.”51 This decision does not speak directly to an ALJ’s appearance of bias. But it reveals that statutory structures that protect administrative adjudicators from agency pressure are relevant to assessing an adjudicator’s “independent judgment on the evidence before him [or her].”52 AJs
lack these “more important” protections.53
The final and most relevant decision, Schweiker v. McClure, held that
no unconstitutional appearance of partiality existed with certain private insurance-carrier AJs.54 Under Medicare Part B, the Secretary of Health and Human Services contracts with insurance carriers to administer the payment of
Part B claims.55 A claimant may seek review of a carrier’s refusal to pay a
claim on the Secretary’s behalf.56 The carrier chooses a hearing officer –
often a current or former employee of the carrier – for that review, and that
review may include an oral hearing.57 The Court held that the use of these
hearing officers was not problematic, despite their various connections to the
insurance carriers, because the carriers, acting as mere agents of the Secretary, had no interest in the outcome of a determination.58 Money to pay
claims comes from federal funds, not the carrier’s funds, and the government,
not the carrier, pays the hearing officer’s salary and administrative costs.59
The challenging parties, moreover, had not brought any evidence “to support
their assertion that, for reasons of psychology, institutional loyalty, or carrier
coercion, [AJs] would be reluctant to differ with carrier determinations.”60
The Court concluded by noting that the AJs’ former or current employment
relationship with the carrier did not create the same partiality concerns as
“professional relationships between a judge and a former partner or associate.”61
But McClure is hardly the shield from administrative partiality challenges that it may first appear. First, unlike the carriers in McClure, federal
agencies appoint AJs and are usually interested in administrative adjudica50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 513–14.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1982).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id.
Id. at 190–91.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 196 n.10.
Id. at 196 n.11.
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tion.62 These agencies are often parties in agency hearings and seek to advance their agency policies through adjudication.63 Second, because the disinterested carriers employ the hearing officers, the Court had no reason to
consider what effect the hiring, salary control, and firing of an interested party would have on the partiality inquiry. Indeed, these powers go directly to
evidence of psychological and coercive pressures that the Court indicated was
relevant, but absent, in McClure.
If McClure nonetheless lingers as an AJ-partiality antidote, the Court’s
more recent Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund decisions limit its potency.64
By requiring the recusal of a judge on whose election a litigating party had a
disproportionate impact, Caperton demonstrates the salience of a party’s role
in appointing or electing an adjudicator.65 This issue was not presented in
McClure because the appointing insurance company, according to the Court,
had no interest in the proceedings; a federal agency ultimately had to pay any
approved claims.66 In other words, the insurance company in McClure was
not a party to the proceedings before the hearing officer. For AJs, agencies
will often be parties whose own regulatory policy is at issue, and the application of that policy will impact private parties.
Free Enterprise Fund, for its part, addresses the relationship between
control and independence – an issue that McClure does not address at all.67
Recall that the Court in Free Enterprise Fund noted that “one who holds his
office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”68 To be sure, the
Court was focused on the virtue of control in the context of the President’s
constitutional supervision over the administrative state.69 But the relationship
between control and independence is no different in the partiality context; the
only difference is that the virtue of independence is favored over control.
Indeed, the Court appeared to approve of dual for-cause provisions that protected ALJs based on their need for independence as adjudicators.70 The issue likely escaped the McClure Court’s attention because, as with the appointment concern, the insurance company’s lack of interest in the proceedings severed the link between the company’s ability to remove the hearing
officers and the substance of the officer’s decision. With AJs, however, the
62. Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 1, at 649.
63. Id. at 648.
64. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Free Enter. Fund v.

Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
65. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886–87.
66. McClure, 456 U.S. at 196.
67. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 495.
68. Id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629
(1935)).
69. Id. at 495–96.
70. See id. at 507 n.10 (“[U]nlike members of the Board, many administrative
law judges of course perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking
functions, see §§ 554(d), 3105, or possess purely recommendatory powers.”).
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relationship remains intact because the agency is a party that has various
forms of control – including the ability to remove, discipline, or reward – the
presiding adjudicator.

IV. FORMALISM AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGGRANDIZEMENT
Partiality challenges to AJs fit well within not only relevant precedent,
but also broader trends in structural litigation. The Roberts Court has applied
a formalist, as opposed to a functionalist, methodology to separation-ofpower (or structural) claims concerning the federal administrative state.
Formalism uses the Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses to separate federal
power clearly into the three branches and relies upon prophylactic boundaries
and structures to shield the three branches from one another.71 Separation-ofpowers violations occur “whenever the categorizations of the exercised power
and the exercising institution do not match and the Constitution does not specifically permit such blending.”72 Functionalism, in contrast, asks whether a
particular practice or structure impermissibly limits the “core function” of the
affected branch.73 As described below, the Roberts Court, despite contrary
and often fluctuating precedent, has applied formalism to claims concerning
the President’s removal power, the Appointments Clause, and Article III protections. The use of formalism is as controversial as it is consistent in these
contexts. These same prophylactic measures, however, have a long, uncontroversial provenance in partiality challenges. Moreover, limiting appearances of partiality provides a modulated response to leading concerns over the
fairness of the administrative state.

A. Formalism’s Triumph
After largely ignoring structural matters for nearly twenty years, the
Court has welcomed separation-of-powers challenges over the past five
years.74 In so doing, the Court has not only addressed or expressed interest in
addressing numerous structural matters, but it has also approached these matters almost exclusively in formal terms, attempting to create prophylactic,
clear boundaries for the various structural matters that it has addressed, without regard to whether the “innovation” at issue meaningfully impacts the affected branch.75
71. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (stating that separation of powers serves as “a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear
distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible
in the heat of interbranch conflict”).
72. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78
CAL. L. REV. 853, 858 (1990).
73. Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1988).
74. See generally Lawson, supra note 72.
75. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 239.
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Consider first the President’s implied power to remove executive officials. The Constitution says nothing expressly about whether the President
must have the ability to remove all or certain executive officials at will. In
Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court upheld the Special Counsel’s protection from the Attorney General’s at-will removal because the President’s
ability to remove the official at will was not central to the “functioning of the
Executive Branch.”76 In doing so, the Court rejected Justice Scalia’s dissenting formalist argument with its “rigid demarcation” that the President had to
be able to remove all executive officers at will as “extrapolation from general
constitutional language which we think is more than the text will bear.”77
This was the Court’s last word on the removal power until the Roberts
Court took up the issue more than twenty years later in Free Enterprise Fund
v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board.78 There, the Court invalidated the
use of dual for-cause removal provisions that provided executive officers two
levels of insulation (one level of for-cause removal protection for the executive officials at issue and one for the officials who could remove them) from
the President’s supervision.79 The Court rejected the dissent’s functional
argument that the removal power was neither necessary nor sufficient for the
President to supervise the executive officials.80 Instead, it exalted a formal
limit on more than one for-cause removal provision between an official and
the President as a mechanism for protecting the President from congressional
overreach.81 This is but one example of the Roberts Court’s reliance on formalism.
The Court also moved from a functional to formal analysis when considering Article III powers. Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”82 The
question in the administrative context concerns which kinds of claims agencies can decide without violating Article III. A couple of years before Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court applied functional reasoning in upholding
the ability of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) to
hear certain state-law, common-law counterclaims in CFTC v. Schor.83 Over
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
Id. at 690 n.29.
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
See id. at 497.
See id. at 499–500.
See id. at 498–502; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise
Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1610–11 (2012) (“[T]he majority opinion[]
in Free Enterprise Fund . . . incorporate[s] and reflect[s] strongly formalist reasoning.”); accord Michael P. Allen, The Roberts Court and How to Say What the Law Is,
40 STETSON L. REV. 671, 683 (2011).
82. U.S. CONST. art. III.
83. 478 U.S. 833, 835–36 (1986).
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the formalist dissent of Justice Brennan,84 the Court applied a functional inquiry that considered whether the grant of jurisdiction to the agency divested
Article III courts of the “essential attributes of judicial power,” the powers
that the agency exercises that are normally reserved to Article III courts, why
Congress departed from using Article III courts, and the importance and
origin of the adjudicated rights.85 But, as in Free Enterprise Fund, the Roberts Court again turned to formalism in Stern v. Marshall when it held that
bankruptcy courts could not decide certain state-law counterclaims that did
not impact a creditor’s proof of claim.86 The Court acknowledged that its
ruling (and the unconstitutional assignment of state-law claims to an Article I
tribunal) would “not change all that much,”87 but it refused to “compromise
the integrity of the system of separated powers . . . , even with respect to
challenges that may seem innocuous at first blush.”88
With the Appointments Clause, the Court’s jurisprudence has largely
remained formalist or textualist. The Appointments Clause requires the President to nominate and the Senate to confirm principal officers.89 In the socalled “Excepting Clause,” Congress may use the same appointment process
as for principal officers or, in its discretion, bestow the appointment of “inferior officers” “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or the Heads of
Departments.”90 In these cases, the Court is usually seeking to distinguish
principal from inferior officers to determine whether an appointment under
the Excepting Clause is permissible,91 or to distinguish inferior officers from
employees to determine whether the Appointments Clause applies at all.92
When an inferior officer is at issue, the Court may also have to define “department” or “head” of a department because not just any official within any
agency can appoint inferior officers.93 The Court, despite some detours, has
provided generally clear guidance on these issues. For instance, an inferior
officer is one “whose work is directed and supervised at some level” by principal officers,94 and “departments” are those “freestanding component[s] of
the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such
component.”95 A formalist, textual approach to the Appointments Clause
likely causes less controversy because of the limited nature of the inquiries
and the detailed constitutional text, relative to the vague text in Article III
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 859–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 851 (majority opinion).
564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 503.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id.
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 510–11 (2010).
92. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
93. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 510–11.
94. Id. at 510 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997)).
95. Id. at 511.
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concerning “judicial powers” or the silence in Article II concerning the President’s removal powers.96
The Roberts Court’s penchant for formalism, clear boundaries, and
prophylaxis suggests that partiality challenges would be as welcome as other
structural challenges. Indeed, much as with the Appointments Clause, formalism and protective walls are not controversial in the partiality context,
strongly suggesting that changes in the Court’s membership should not affect
the success of partiality challenges. To overcome the presumption that adjudicators are impartial,97 the Court looks for incentives or certain features relating to an adjudicator’s tenure that raise reasonable doubts over the adjudicator’s impartiality. Evidence of actual bias is not necessary.98 Limiting
when an adjudicator can hear a case that financially interests her, impacts a
budget that she oversees, or concerns a party that had a disproportionate impact on her appointment were all formal limits that earlier decisions used to
prevent hard-to-uncover actual bias99 and to protect the reputation and authority of the tribunal at issue.100 Relatedly, preventing a party-agency from hiring, disciplining, and removing an AJ before whom it appears provides clear
boundaries to prevent actual bias and to protect the administrative tribunal’s
reputation.
Indeed, AJ challenges permit perhaps the best kind of formalism: clear
rules that easily further the underlying objectives of prohibiting an appearance of partiality. The common features of AJs that create partiality concerns
– the party-agency’s direct hiring of, oversight of, and ability to remove AJs –
are easy to identify. Unlike in Caperton, one need not determine when a
party has a “significant and disproportionate,”101 yet indirect, influence on an
adjudicator’s selection because the agency directly chooses AJs. And unlike
in Ward, one need not determine whether the fiscal connection between a
ruling and a budget for which the adjudicator oversees is sufficiently close to
cause partiality problems because the agency has the authority to award bonuses to (and remove) AJs directly. Hiring, oversight, and removal are also
directly connected to the underlying objectives of limiting hard-to-uncover
bias and protecting the integrity of the tribunal. In contrast, the Free Enterprise Fund Court’s refusal to permit dual for-cause removal provisions – but
96. See Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J.
665, 669 (2016) (citing John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944–45 (2011)).
97. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1940); see also Schweiker
v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).
98. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882 (2010) (before
finding appearance of partiality, noting the judge at issue declared he had no actual
bias and stating the Court would not determine whether actual bias existed).
99. See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance
of Bias, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 943, 968 (discussing how recusal standards in American
jurisdictions center around appearances of impartiality).
100. See id. at 967–69.
101. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.
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its acceptance of one level of protection – smacked of arbitrariness because,
as Justice Breyer explained in his dissent, the second level of protection
seemed highly unlikely to have any effect on the President’s supervisory
power in light of the permissible first level that precluded him from removing
principal officers without cause.102

B. Pragmatic Method of Addressing Administrative Aggrandizement
Scholars103 and members of the Supreme Court, as I discuss below, have
recently expressed concern at what appears to be agencies’ ever-increasing
power with questionable constitutional authority. I do not enter that debate
here. Instead, I argue that for those Justices who are concerned with administrative overreach, attending to the AJs’ partiality problems provides a pragmatic and realistic first step. Partiality challenges are more likely to attract
their colleagues who are not skeptical of administrative aggrandizement than
recent suggested challenges to Chevron deference, the nondelegation doctrine, and Auer deference.

1. Suggested Challenges to Administrative Law
First. One could attack Chevron deference – under which courts defer
to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes104 – as Justice
Thomas has advocated, on originalist grounds. Despite authoring one of the
Court’s opinions that most significantly expanded Chevron deference,105 Justice Thomas has more recently argued in his concurring opinion in Michigan
v. EPA that Chevron deference presented “serious separation-of-powers questions” because it either, if interpreting a statute, contravened the original understanding of the courts’ Article III power to “say what the law is,”106 or, if
making policy, violated the prohibition on delegating legislative power under
Article I.107
But such a direct attack on Chevron is unlikely to succeed. First, no
other Justice has suggested going so far. Second, Chevron may not be an
102. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 525–
30 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1245 (1994); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL? (2014).
104. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984).
105. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 982 (2005) (requiring courts to defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous statutes even if courts have previously indicated that another interpretation
of the ambiguous statutory language is preferred).
106. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
107. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 9

1036

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

appropriate target. Justice Scalia had argued that Chevron can reasonably be
reconciled with the Article III Vesting Clause as consistent with longstanding
judicial deference to federal executive actions in mandamus proceedings.108
Likewise, Chevron may be consistent with Marbury v. Madison.109 Despite
Marbury’s clarion call for courts to “say what the law is,”110 the decision
recognized the distinction between judicially enforceable “specific duties”
and congressionally assigned discretion to the executive that exists outside
the judicial province.111 These distinctions are exceedingly similar to Chevron’s distinctions between clear congressional commands and delegating
interpretive authority to executive agencies.112
That said, several Justices – and perhaps even the entire Court – have
indicated their concern over a full-throated Chevron doctrine. One expression of the sentiment comes from a majority of Justices’ failure to apply
Chevron where it would seem to apply. When recently concluding that the
Fair Housing Act permitted disparate-impact claims,113 the Court ultimately
agreed with the Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) notice-andcomment regulation.114 It, however, failed to engage in a Chevron inquiry.115
Perhaps this was because, as the dissenting Justices feared, HUD had not
given its “fair and considered judgment on the matter in question”116 by issuing the regulation shortly after the Court had called for the Solicitor General’s
views in a prior case concerning the same issue.117 But the majority’s silence
– especially its failure to refer to precedent that could support Chevron’s ban-

108. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 242–43 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Center and Periphery in Antebellum Federal
Administration: The Multiple Faces of Popular Control, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331,
346 (2010) (agreeing that writ review was historically “quite deferential” but arguing
that common law actions against executive officials “could provide substantial relief”). This defense from constitutional infirmity does not address the striking conflict with the APA’s command that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
questions of law [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (2012). But perhaps the same historical practice could inform the background
understanding of the enacting Congress as to when the courts should set aside agency
action. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 242 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. See generally Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137.
110. Id. at 177.
111. Id. at 165–66, 170.
112. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 163 (5th ed.
2010).
113. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
114. See id.
115. See generally id.
116. See id. at 2542 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012)).
117. See id. at 2543.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/9

14

Barnett: Why Bias Challenges

2016]

BIAS CHALLENGES

1037

ishment from its decision118 – created questions over why Chevron didn’t
apply where it otherwise would.
The Court has also expressly limited, or certain Justices have sought to
limit, Chevron’s reach. The Court in King v. Burwell refused to apply Chevron when, consistent with an IRS Rule, it permitted tax credits for taxpayers
enrolled in federal health-insurance exchanges.119 The Court eschewed Chevron, despite finding the relevant statutory language ambiguous,120 because of
the tax credits’ “deep ‘economic and political significance’” and the likelihood that Congress would not have delegated the resolution of this healthinsurance-policy question to a taxing agency.121 The Court had suggested in
earlier decisions that an agency’s new-found power to regulate in an area of
such significance was important for determining whether, under Chevron’s
inquiry, the statute was ambiguous.122 King went further and indicated that
such questions could be inappropriate for Chevron’s applicability altogether.123 Relatedly, three dissenting Justices in City of Arlington v. FCC argued
that Chevron should engage in a more searching inquiry to determine whether
Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency as to the specific statutory question at issue.124
But even these two modes of restricting Chevron’s reach have problems
that accompany limiting agency autonomy. Ignoring Chevron’s applicability
is not a solution because doing so creates an opaque, incoherent doctrine.
That opacity may be especially troubling, even to Justices sympathetic to
aggrandizement arguments, because they, like Justice Scalia, may view Chevron as beneficial in providing a stable “background rule of law against which
Congress can legislate.”125 Limiting Chevron’s reach is a better approach.
But a standards-based exception from Chevron suffers from similar opacity
concerns. Doesn’t the Court perennially accept questions of “deep economic
and political importance”? Isn’t that why Court-watching is at its zenith at
the end of every Term in June? More importantly, even by King’s own
terms, the political-and-economic exception is applicable only in “extraordi118. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1352 (2015) (refusing to grant Skidmore deference to an EEOC guideline because, in part, it was promulgated after the Court had granted certiorari in the case at issue).
119. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487, 2488–89, 2496 (2015).
120. See id. at 2492.
121. Id. at 2488–89 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,
2444 (2014)).
122. See, e.g., Util. Air. Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444; FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131–34 (2000), superseded by statute,
Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§
907(d)(3)(A)–(B), 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 387–387u).
123. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
124. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
125. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517.
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nary” cases.126 If the Court’s decision in City of Arlington indicates that
agencies’ pronouncements as to their own jurisdiction are not extraordinary
instances, there might be little left in the set of excepted interpretations to
make such case-by-case limitations worthwhile.
Second. Overruling or significantly narrowing the nondelegation doctrine, in contrast, would dramatically affect agencies’ powers. But it suffers
from the same problems that inflict the Chevron-based challenges. Justice
Thomas has also attacked the Court’s nondelegation doctrine, which prohibits
Congress from delegating lawmaking authority to agencies without providing
an “intelligible principle,” on several grounds.127 He argued that the Court
had improperly permitted Congress to do more than bestow the authority
upon the President to make factual determinations as to whether a particular
contingency had come into being128 or make certain policy decisions related
to foreign affairs.129 Moreover, he argued that the Court, by misreading its
precedent, had improperly permitted the “intelligible principle” to apply to
more than regulating the conduct of the branch at issue130 and, over the years,
to become so elastic as to have no limiting principle.131 As with his frontal
challenge to Chevron, Justice Thomas stands alone, likely because his challenge to the nondelegation doctrine requires a substantial revision to
longstanding precedent. Even if others share his originalist leanings, the substantial disruption to the modern administrative state is likely too much for
many of his colleagues to bear. Justice Thomas concedes that a full-throated
nondelegation doctrine would require “inhibit[ing] the government from acting with the speed and efficiency Congress has sometimes found desirable.”132 But it would do more than lead to slower government action; it
would render agencies mere shadows of their former selves. Congress would
be required to legislate on technical subjects on a magnitude too large for it to
keep a modern economy and government functioning. In short, a proposed
nondelegation renaissance likely makes functionalists out of formalists.
Third. Perhaps the most promising challenge concerns Seminole Rock
or Auer deference. Under that doctrine, first articulated in Bowles v. Seminole Rock in 1945133 and reaffirmed in Auer v. Robbins in 1997,134 courts
defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations unless “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent.”135 Commenters have defended (and challenged)
Auer deference as being grounded in notions of agency expertise, the agen126. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489–90.
127. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1242–44 (2015)

(Thomas, J., concurring).
128. See id. at 1246–47.
129. See id. at 1247–48.
130. See id. at 1249–50.
131. See id. at 1251.
132. Id. at 1252.
133. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945).
134. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997).
135. Id. at 461 (citations omitted).
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cy’s role in drafting congressional legislation, or a means of providing uniformity in lower-court decisions.136 Despite authoring the Court’s Auer decision, Justice Scalia indicated in separate opinions that the Court should end
Auer deference.137 Influenced by his former law clerk, Professor John Manning,138 Justice Scalia had argued that deferring to agencies’ interpretations of
regulations that they promulgated “seems contrary to fundamental principles
of separation of powers” and encourages agencies to draft vague rules to interpret, “in future adjudications, . . . [as] it pleases.”139 Justice Scalia had
reiterated his view,140 and Justices Thomas141 and Alito,142 along with Chief
Justice Roberts,143 seem open to rethinking the issue.
Although I favor reimagining Auer deference into an analogue of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,144 in which the courts consider various factors to determine whether to give the agency’s interpretation weight,145 it is unclear if a
majority of the Court, especially after Justice Scalia’s death, would be willing
to revise Auer deference. Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas

136. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339–42 (2013) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
137. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68–69 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
138. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996) (cited in Talk Am.,
Inc., 564 U.S. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
139. Talk Am., Inc., 564 U.S. at 68–69 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211–13 (2015) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339–42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“I await a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may be explored through full
briefing and argument.”). See also Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
143. See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
144. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“We consider that the
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
145. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79
GEO. WASH. L.J. 1449, 1458 (2011) (suggesting that Seminole Rock may be better if
Skidmore-like weight, instead of Chevron-like deference, applied to informal agency
interpretations of regulations); Nicholas R. Bednar, Comment, Defying Auer Deference: Skidmore as a Solution to Conservative Concerns in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, MINN. L. REV.: DE NOVO (June 24, 2015),
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2015/06/defying-auer-deference-skidmoresolution-conservative-concerns-perez-v-mortgage-bankers-association/.
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and Alito have shown interest in reconsidering the doctrine.146 The other
Justices may simply be hesitant to overrule a longstanding doctrine on stare
decisis grounds. Or they may have pragmatic concerns over how easily the
Court can fell the longstanding doctrine, given that agencies may rely on both
their interpretation of a statute – for which Chevron deference may be appropriate – and a regulation in a particular interpretation. Or they may not be
convinced that the agencies’ combined rulemaking and adjudicatory functions present meaningful separation-of-powers concerns because the regulatory state is founded on countenanced notions of combined legislative, adjudicatory, and enforcement functions as all part of executive authority.147 Or
they may think that the Court’s various limits on the doctrine – its refusal to
defer when the agency merely “parrots” the statute via the interpreted regulation,148 when the interpretation does not appear to reflect an “agency’s fair
and considered judgment,”149 when the agency’s interpretations are inconsistent,150 or when the agency merely presents a “post hoc rationalization”151
– are sufficient to prevent the doctrine from permitting the worst, and perhaps
unlikely, abuses.152

2. Impartiality as a Realistic First Step
Unlike challenges to Chevron, nondelegation, and perhaps even Auer,
bias-based challenges against agency adjudicators are more likely to command a majority of interested Justices. The partiality argument against administrative judges in Part II relies primarily on two recent Court decisions,
each of which commanded a majority, with only Justice Kennedy joining the
Court’s more liberal bloc in one and the more conservative bloc in the other.
Consider Caperton. The Caperton majority indicated its concern over a
party’s significant, although indirect, influence in the selection of a judge.153
The four more conservative dissenting Justices, despite “shar[ing] the majority’s sincere concerns about the need to maintain a fair, independent, and im146. Judge Frank Easterbrook had identified a possible vehicle for the Court to
rethink Auer, but the Court denied certiorari. See Bible v. United Student Aid Funds,
Inc., 807 F.3d 839, 840–41 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016) (mem.).
147. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of
CHI.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming),
Auer,
U.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2716737##.
148. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006).
149. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012)
(citations omitted).
150. See id. (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)).
151. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)).
152. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 147, at 19–20 (discussing “checks on
agencies built into the Auer framework”).
153. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883–85 (2009).
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partial judiciary – and one that appears to be such,”154 largely criticized the
majority’s failure to define when a party had a sufficient indirect influence
over the state judge’s selection to violate due process.155 Notably, the challenge to AJs does not suffer this failing because of the agencies’ direct appointment and control over AJs. To be sure, certain questions may still exist:
For instance, what effect do regulations that limit agency interference or removal of an AJ have? Can agencies ever sufficiently separate the division of
the agency that hires and removes AJs from the division of the agency that
appears as a party? Does it matter whether the agency appears as an adversarial party, as opposed to merely having certain policy preferences relevant
to the adjudication between private parties? Nevertheless, the boundaries of
an AJ-partiality claim are much more defined than in Caperton state-election
claims, in which courts must attempt to intuit when a candidate’s supporter,
who also has a case before the court, has impermissibly influenced an election by donating money to the candidate and third parties. In other words,
even the dissenting Justices should have little quarrel with a Caperton claim
in the AJ context.
Then turn to Free Enterprise Fund. The more conservative majority
recognized the relationship between removal, control, and independence.156
They did so in the context of not only political appointees, but also agency
adjudicators.157 They attempted to defend ALJs’ dual for-cause protection
from removal based on, among other things, their adjudicative function.158
This distinction reveals the majority’s discomfort with permitting the President (or perhaps any agency head) to directly control an agency adjudicator
and its receptiveness to considering how control affects partiality in the administrative context. The more liberal dissenting Justices, although skeptical
of the President’s removal power as a talisman of control,159 recognized that
regulation through impartial adjudication can arise by protecting adjudicators
from at-will removal.160 Conversely, at-will removal of agency adjudicators
leads to partial adjudication, which due process proscribes.161 In other words,
all of the Justices appeared to recognize the necessity of protecting adjudicators from agency control as a means of protecting their impartiality.

154. Id. at 890 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 890–91 (“Unlike the established grounds for disqualification, a

‘probability of bias’ cannot be defined in any limited way. The Court’s new ‘rule’
provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required.”); see also id. at 890–99.
156. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
501 (2010).
157. See id. at 506–07.
158. See id. at 507 n.10.
159. See id. at 524 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 522.
161. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1982) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
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Both dissenting blocs in Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund worried
about the effects of the majority’s rulings, either on litigation strategy or administrative chaos.162 A ruling that the current AJ system is unconstitutional
would have a widespread effect on the federal government’s largest cadre of
adjudicators. Not only were the majorities in both cases unmoved about the
supposed effects of their rulings, but agency adjudication already has a template for sufficiently independent adjudicators – the APA’s protections for
ALJs. The solution is for agencies to use ALJs when permitted under their
implementing statutes or for Congress to pass general legislation requiring
agencies to engage in formal adjudication whenever a statute or agency permits an evidentiary hearing.
To avoid disruption, the Court could rule that due process does not require as much from the administrative judiciary as it does state and federal
judges. After all, courts have only required that agency heads avoid having
an “unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the rulemaking” to satisfy due process in the rulemaking context,163 a standard that is
so high as to have little practical effect. But doing so in adjudication is problematic. First, such an ineffective standard renders administrative hearings
susceptible to allegations that they are merely for show. Second, creating forshow hearings is anathema to those seeking effective, respected government
action and those seeking to limit arbitrary government action. Moreover,
creating a different partiality norm for administrative adjudication, as opposed to other forms of adjudication, would add a new complexity to the already case-by-case Due Process Clause doctrine.
Because of the implications of a judicial decision concerning AJ partiality, Congress and the President should act before courts force them to.
Doing so not only avoids administrative chaos, but it returns agency adjudication to its intended form under the APA.164 The very problems that I identified for AJs here are not new. Shortly after the APA’s enactment, U.S. Attorney General J. Howard McGrath stated that “[i]f salaries and promotions
are subject to agency control, there is always danger that a subtle influence
will be exerted upon the examiners to decide in accordance with agency
wishes.”165 Guaranteeing that agency adjudication has its constitutional appearance of impartiality – the appearance that Congress intended it to have
under the APA – is not too much for Congress and the President to accomplish.
162. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 899–900 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 902–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Free Enter. Fund, 561
U.S. at 536–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, supra note 33, at 1364 (discussing the Free Enterprise Fund dissenters’ alarm at the potential impact of the Court’s decision).
163. Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
164. See William Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 882–89 (2006).
165. Administrative Procedure Act, Promotion of Hearing Examiners, 41 Op.
Att’y Gen. 74, 78 (1951).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made clear that it welcomes structural challenges to the administrative state. Perhaps challenges to Chevron deference, the
nondelegation doctrine, Auer deference, or the President’s authority to remove executive officers will arrive at First Street in the near future. But parties, agencies, the President, and Congress should not overlook partiality
challenges concerning AJs. Determining that unconstitutional appearances of
partiality exist with AJs requires no overruling of precedent, permits a natural
application of existing precedent, and provides a pragmatic means of protecting the apparent fairness of administrative action.
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